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THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE OF OUR TIME 
Dawn C. Nunziatoa1 
INTRODUCTION 
Here we go, once more unto the breach, to face yet another battle in the near decade-long war over net neutrality. Some of the 
combatants have changed, and their positions have shifted slightly, but today we find essentially the same interests 
represented and the same arguments advanced. On one side, the major cable, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), and wireless 
broadband providers continue to argue against increasing the Federal Communication Commision’s (FCC) authority over 
how these providers manage the flow of information through their pipes. On the other side, we have content providers, 
Internet users, and--this time--the FCC, contending that the government has the power to protect the free flow of information 
on the Internet. In 2002, the FCC under President George W. Bush and then Chairman Kevin Martin embarked on a course of 
extremely light (which turned out to be nonexistent)1 regulatory oversight of broadband providers. The Obama 
administration, with Chairman Julius Genachowski now at the helm, is attempting to reverse this course and impose a 
meaningful net neutrality mandate on broadband providers. In this iteration, not only has the FCC switched sides, but, to keep 
things interesting, Google and Verizon-- typically on opposite sides of the net neutrality debate--have joined together to find 
common ground and have proposed a compromise position. 
Many of the issues are nuanced, yet the general contours of the arguments are relatively straightforward. On the one hand, the 
broadband providers’ argument continues to proceed something like this: Trust the market. Any imperfections in the market 
or barriers to free and open Internet communications will be cured by the market itself. The market is robust and has thrived 
thus far without regulation, and the Internet will only be hampered by regulation. There is simply no need for net neutrality 
regulation because there is hardly any evidence that broadband providers have discriminated against content or applications 
(and Comcast had good reasons for blocking BitTorrent traffic). Furthermore, regulation of broadband providers will violate 
those providers’ First Amendment rights as speakers to select, edit, block, or favor the content of their choosing.2 
In response, the proponents of net neutrality regulation such as myself argue that broadband providers serve as increasingly 
important conduits for our communications.3 This is especially true with respect to those providers’ ability to manage the 
“transmission component” of broadband communications--the part the FCC now seeks to regulate. Conduits for 
communications--which we call “common carriers,” such as telephone companies, the postal service, and telegraph 
companies of old--have long been under a legal obligation not to discriminate against the communications they are charged 
with carrying. The telephone company cannot refuse to connect your call because your conversation is racy,4 nor can the 
postal service refuse to deliver your mail because it contains unpopular political propaganda.5 This basic duty not to 
discriminate is imposed regardless of the existence of monopoly control by communications conduits. We have learned over 
the past century not to entrust our free speech interests to “the market.” Rather, we regulate these conduits for communication 
because doing so is necessary to ensure the free flow of information. The relevant free speech interests at issue here are not 
those of the broadband provider (which are virtually nonexistent) but those of members of the public whose communications 
must be facilitated free of discrimination or censorship in order for democratic self-government to fun 
Notably, both sides of the net neutrality debate invoke free speech in support of their cause. As a result, the net neutrality 
battle has turned into what has been called “the First Amendment issue of our time.”6 In what follows, I explore some of the 
latest contours of the net neutrality debate, with an eye toward evaluating the First Amendment and free speech implications 
of both sides’ arguments. Part I examines the specifics of the approaches to net neutrality regulation recently proposed by the 
FCC and the Verizon-Google team. In Part II, I critique broadband providers’ arguments that net neutrality regulation would 
violate their First Amendment rights. Part III argues that proposed transparency-only requirements for wireless broadband 
providers are insufficient to protect our full range of free speech interests. And Part IV proposes a framework for regulating 
“specialized” online services that is informed by the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine. 
I. THE LATEST BATTLE LINES 
   
 
 
 
Over the past several months, we have seen a whirlwind of net neutrality developments. In the wake of April’s Comcast 
decision, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the FCC’s assertion of 
“ancillary” authority to censure Comcast for impeding the free flow of information on the Internet,7 the FCC floated a new 
approach to regulating broadband in an attempt to reassert its power in this arena.8 In its “Third Way” proposal released in 
June, the Agency announced its intention to change directions from the deregulatory course it began in 2002 and suggested 
imposing a minimal nondiscrimination mandate upon broadband providers. Specifically, the FCC gave notice of its plan to 
reclassify the transmission component of broadband as a regulated “telecommunications service” under Title II of the 
Communications Act, rather than as an unregulated “information service.”9 The FCC’s approach is intended to strike a 
balance between two extremes--on the one hand, exempting broadband providers from any meaningful nondiscrimination 
rules (the status quo), and on the other, fully reclassifying broadband services as “telecommunications services” and 
imposing the full (and onerous) slate of common carrier regulations on them. The Commission’s Third Way approach would 
conceptually bifurcate the services offered by broadband providers into (1) a transmissions component, through which 
providers facilitate the transfer of bits, pure and simple, from individuals’ computers to and from the Internet, and (2) 
additional services offered by broadband providers, like technical support and e-mail account service. It would impose a 
nondiscrimination mandate only on the transmissions component. This reclassification would essentially mean that 
broadband providers would be treated in some respects as common carriers--as are telephone services and the postal service--
and that they would be required to facilitate the transmission of all legal communications in a nondiscriminatory manner. But, 
under “Third Way,” the FCC would refrain from applying a number of Title II’s forty-eight common-carrier regulations to 
broadband providers, and would apply only a handful of sections necessary to prohibit discriminatory practices, including 
Sections 201, 202, and 208, of the Communications Act.10 
  
This proposed mandate is only part of the story. The FCC has suggested that this nondiscrimination mandate should apply 
only to the transmissions component of wireline or fixed broadband providers in their provision of general broadband 
Internet access. The Commission would excuse mobile wireless broadband (iPhones’ and Androids’ Internet access, for 
example) from the nondiscrimination requirement. The FCC has also suggested that, while a nondiscrimination mandate 
should apply to the provision of general wireline broadband Internet access, this mandate should not necessarily apply to the 
provision of specialized services--those with a different scope or purpose than general broadband Internet access service--
such as premium online gaming services or health care monitoring services.11 This three-part approach was also more or less 
espoused by Google and Verizon in their controversial Legislative Framework Proposal released in August.12 Those 
companies proposed that general fixed or wireline broadband Internet access (cable broadband and DSL) should be subject to 
a (qualified)13 nondiscrimination mandate but that this mandate should not apply to “additional online services” that are 
“distinguishable in scope and purpose from broadband Internet access.”14 Nor would the Verizon-Google nondiscrimination 
mandate apply to mobile wireless broadband. Under their proposal, wireless broadband providers would be subject only to a 
transparency requirement, requiring such providers merely to disclose information to their users regarding whatever 
discriminatory practices they may adopt.15 In what follows, I explore the free speech implications of the arguments for and 
against this proposed three-part regulatory approach, i.e., 
(1) a nondiscrimination mandate imposed on general wireline and fixed broadband services; 
(2) a transparency-in-discrimination mandate--with no corresponding nondiscrimination mandate--imposed on 
mobile wireless broadband; and 
(3) no nondiscrimination mandate imposed on “specialized” or “additional online” services provided by 
broadband providers. 
 II. BROADBAND PROVIDERS ARE PRIMARILY CONDUITS NOT SPEAKERS AND ARE PROPERLY 
SUBJECT TO A NONDISCRIMINATION MANDATE 
The FCC’s proposal to reverse its course of the past decade and reclassify the transmission component of general wireline 
broadband Internet access is a controversial but necessary fix for the problem created by the FCC’s own hand in 2002 when it 
chose to exempt cable broadband providers from meaningful nondiscrimination regulation. Although this proposal will 
continue to face strong opposition from broadband providers on a variety of fronts, in what follows, I address specifically the 
First Amendment arguments put forth by opponents of the proposal. 
  
Broadband providers have long clung to the argument that they enjoy the First Amendment right to censor the content of their 
choosing and that a nondiscrimination mandate would violate their free speech rights. Even while claiming that they do not 
actually discriminate against expression and that they in fact allow for the free flow of all types of information through their 
pipes,16 they claim that their primary role for purposes of First Amendment analysis is similar to that of a newspaper editor--
that of a selector or editor of the Internet’s content and as a speaker in their own right, not as a conduit for the 
communications of others. They characterize their role as such to champion their right to censor the content of their choosing 
and to shore up their First Amendment rights under existing precedent.17 Verizon, for example, characterizes the provision of 
broadband Internet access as first and foremost “the microphone through which broadband Internet access providers speak,”18 
and claims that “Verizon’s position under the First Amendment as a broadband Internet access provider is no different than a 
newspaper publisher’s”19--that is, as an editor or selector of content. The Supreme Court has held that government 
interference with newspaper publishers’ discretion, such as by requiring newspapers to publish content not of their choosing, 
violates the newspapers’ First Amendment rights.20 Verizon argues that the FCC’s proposed “regulation of broadband 
networks today presents the same speech concerns that regulation of newspapers has historically created.”21 
Broadband providers’ efforts to cast themselves primarily in the role of speakers or editors in opposing the nondiscrimination 
mandate for the provision of general broadband services misconstrues the realities of broadband Internet access and 
misinterprets First Amendment case law and policy. In providing general broadband Internet access--as opposed to 
specialized or additional services--broadband providers like Verizon and Comcast predominantly function for First 
Amendment purposes as conduits for the speech of others, not as speakers or editors in their own right. Recall that the 
proposed regulation at issue targets the transmission component of general broadband service, not the add-on or specialized 
services offered by such providers. Broadband providers’ primary function with respect to the transmission component of 
their general broadband Internet access is to serve as conduit or pipeline for the speech of others. When we analyze where on 
the First Amendment spectrum-- pure conduit versus pure editor and selector--broadband providers fall with respect to the 
transmission component of general broadband Internet access, it becomes clear that this function places them much closer to 
the conduit end than the editor end. Although Comcast and Verizon, for example, may exercise some editorial discretion and 
selectivity in providing additional online or specialized services, as in email or security or gaming services, their predominant 
function in providing the transmission component for general broadband Internet access is that of serving as a conduit for the 
expression of Internet users. Furthermore, unlike in the scenario in which the Court recognized newspapers’ First 
Amendment right not to be associated with speech that was not of their choosing, there is virtually no risk that the content 
required to be facilitated via a broadband provider’s pipes under the nondiscrimination mandate would ever be attributed to 
the broadband provider itself.22 
Even assuming that broadband providers enjoy a minimal First Amendment interest in the transmission or conduit functions 
they perform, a nondiscrimination mandate would be analyzed and upheld by courts as a content-neutral regulation of speech 
that survives intermediate scrutiny.23 In Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC, cable network operators objected to “must 
carry” rules imposed by the FCC, requiring them to carry certain news and educational programming not of their choosing, 
and limiting their editorial discretion over the content that could be provided over their cable channels. The Court specifically 
rejected the analogy the cable operators sought to draw between their First Amendment rights and those of newspaper 
publishers.24 It held that the First Amendment editorial rights of the cable network operators were quite limited.25 And the 
rights of broadband providers are even more limited given the differences between the two mediums. In particular, the Court 
distinguished the amount and type of control that cable network operators exercise over the communications received by their 
subscribers from the editorial discretion exercised by newspapers. It noted that, in contrast to newspapers, cable operators 
enjoy “bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most ... programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home” and that 
“simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from 
obtaining access to programming it chooses to exclude.”26 The Court concluded that the FCC enjoys the power to “ensure that 
private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information 
and ideas.”27 
While recognizing that the “must carry” rules interfered to some extent with the First Amendment rights of cable network 
operators, the Court ultimately held in Turner II that these regulations were justified in light of the control that cable 
operators exert over the free flow of information and ideas.28 It held that the challenged regulations were content-neutral and 
did not burden more of the cable operators’ speech than necessary to further the government’s important interests.29 In his 
concurring opinion in Turner II, Justice Breyer explained that the “must carry” regulations served the purpose of advancing 
the national communications policy of protecting “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources” and “facilitat[ing] the public discussion and informed deliberation [that] democratic government 
presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve.”30 Justice Breyer concluded that although there were First 
Amendment interests “on both sides of the equation”--as in the current net neutrality debate--the “must carry” regulations 
struck a reasonable balance between potentially speech-restricting consequences for cable operators and speech-enhancing 
consequences for members of the public.31 
As in Turner II, the FCC’s proposed net neutrality regulations are content-neutral regulations that would survive intermediate 
scrutiny. The nondiscrimination requirement that would be imposed upon the transmission component of broadband 
providers’ services makes no reference to the type or kind of content that must be facilitated. And the free speech interests of 
members of the public in having broadband providers serve as neutral conduits for our communications are even more 
pressing than in the Turner II context. Like the regulations at issue in Turner II, but to an even greater extent, the proposed 
nondiscrimination regulations advance the substantial government interest of protecting the public’s access to the free flow of 
information and ideas--including access to unpopular or controversial expression, such as that regarding abortion or medical 
marijuana offerings, as discussed below.32 Even if broadband providers were able to convince a court that their First 
Amendment interests were implicated by such regulation--and they are implicated far less than cable operators’ interests in 
Turner II--Turner II would counsel in favor of holding that such interests were outweighed by the countervailing free speech 
interests that promote broad information dissemination, public discussion, and deliberation.33 The predominant free speech 
interests implicated by the nondiscrimination mandate are those of members of the public--end users and content providers--
in nondiscriminatory transmission of the expression they seek to send and receive, not those of the broadband providers in 
providing general broadband Internet access. The public’s free speech interests outweigh whatever minimal editorial rights 
might be asserted by broadband providers with respect to the transmission component of their services, and therefore a 
nondiscrimination rule imposed by the FCC would not violate the First Amendment rights of broadband providers. 
III. WIRELESS BROADBAND: TRANSPARENCY ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT
The FCC and the Verizon-Google proposal both suggest that wireless broadband Internet access providers should be immune 
from nondiscrimination regulations imposed on wireline broadband providers and that they should be subject only to a 
disclosure or transparency-in-discrimination requirement. This means that a wireless broadband provider would be permitted, 
for example, to cut a deal with YouTube that allowed its videos to stream faster than a video on Hulu--or even to block Hulu 
or other disfavored content or applications entirely--so long as the provider somehow disclosed to its subscribers that it was 
doing so. The justifications for this exception to the nondiscrimination mandate primarily rest on the grounds that the 
wireless market is comparatively more competitive than the wireline market, and that wireless networks share comparatively 
more limited capacity, which necessitates more active management by wireless carriers.34 These arguments for exempting 
wireless from the nondiscrimination mandate, however, suffer from some of the same flaws as the argument advanced by the 
FCC when it exempted cable broadband from nondiscrimination regulation a decade ago, as discussed above.35 And, as 
before, this approach will lead to the same problems. 
A mere disclosure mandate, without a nondiscrimination mandate, is insufficient to protect Internet users’ free speech 
interests with respect to wireless broadband Internet access. A disclosure mandate would merely help to facilitate a market 
for competition among wireless providers. Even assuming that we should entrust our First Amendment values to the market, 
the disclosure requirement would be insufficient to protect these values because the imperfect market conditions in the 
wireless market render meaningful market discipline unlikely. But more importantly, First Amendment values are 
quintessentially nonmarket values that cannot be adequately protected by the market in any case. 
First, it is unclear whether a disclosure mandate would have any effect at all. If the duty to disclose what content you are 
discriminating against or blocking merely involves inserting another line in an already lengthy terms of service contract that 
no subscriber ever reads anyway, then such a mandate will have virtually no effect. Even if subscribers did read through 
wireless providers’ terms of service, to meaningfully discipline a provider whose practices they disagreed with, they would 
need to be able easily and costlessly cancel one wireless broadband subscription and switch to another alternative service 
whose discrimination practices were more consistent with their own-- which they cannot do in today’s market.36 
   
 
 
 
More importantly, even assuming ease of exit and meaningful switching options, a transparency-in-discrimination 
requirement does not afford adequate protections for Internet users’ free speech rights because such a requirement results, at 
best, in protection for whatever speech wins out in “the market,” and does not sufficiently protect unpopular speech from 
discrimination. But the First Amendment’s most important function is to protect speech that is unpopular, controversial, or 
indeed widely reviled, as I discuss below.37 
  
As an example of discrimination against unpopular speech, consider the actions of Verizon Wireless in restricting the 
expression of a pro-choice organization. In 2007, Verizon Wireless refused to allow NARAL Pro-Choice America to transmit 
text messages to NARAL’s own members.38 Asserting its authority to block messages from any group that seeks to 
“distribute content that, in [Verizon’s] discretion, may be seen as controversial or unsavory to any of our users,” Verizon 
initially refused to facilitate the transmission of such messages to certain users--even when those users had explicitly signed 
up to receive NARAL’s messages.39 In that case, Verizon ultimately bowed to public pressure (after it was subject to criticism 
in the mainstream media--including in a front page article in the New York Times) and reversed course (while maintaining 
that it enjoys the discretion to determine which text messages to facilitate and which to prohibit).40 Although the market 
imposed a sufficient check on Verizon’s censorship under the circumstances of that case, consider the case in which the 
majority of the relevant public did not support the speech at issue. (Indeed, T-Mobile’s recent censorship of text messages 
relating to legal medical marijuana services provides an example of discrimination against such controversial or unpopular 
content.)41 If a wireless provider found that there was insufficient popular support for particular “controversial” or “unsavory” 
(but First Amendment protected) communications, it might very well censor such expression, and a transparency requirement 
would not impose a sufficient check on such an action because such speech (being unpopular) could not garner sufficient 
popular support. And, if wireless providers enjoy the discretion to censor in this context, they also enjoy the discretion to 
censor content beyond text messages--including web page access, emails, and other content that is directly or indirectly under 
their control. 
  
Such censorship of unpopular speech by wireless providers is inconsistent with the First Amendment.42 If there is a “bedrock 
principle” of the First Amendment,43 it is that government may not prohibit speech simply because “the overwhelming 
majority of people might find [it] distasteful or discomforting.”44 Rather, the unpopularity of the speech is the very reason 
“for according it constitutional protection”45--including in such contexts as burning the American flag,46 depicting animal 
cruelty,47 cross burning,48 and similar hate speech, such as pro-Nazi speech addressed to Holocaust survivors.49 As Justice 
Kennedy has explained, “the creation of standards and adherence to them, even when it means affording protection to speech 
unpopular or distasteful, is the central achievement of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”50 Because of the importance of 
protecting unpopular or counter-majoritarian speech within our constitutional framework, mandating transparency-in-
discrimination alone for wireless broadband providers--without mandating nondiscrimination--will not suffice to protect our 
full panoply of free speech rights and will not serve as a meaningful check on wireless providers’ discrimination against 
unpopular, controversial, but constitutionally protected speech. To protect this fundamental aspect of the free speech 
guarantee, wireless broadband providers must also be subject to a nondiscrimination mandate. 
  
Furthermore, even assuming that a transparency-in-discrimination mandate protects the free speech interests of the would-be 
recipient of a blocked communication, such a requirement does virtually nothing to protect the free speech interests of the 
would-be speaker whose speech is blocked. If a wireless provider is merely under the obligation to disclose to a would-be 
speaker that his or her expression will be blocked, that leaves the speaker with no recourse to reach his or her intended 
audience. If, for example, Verizon Wireless were to inform NARAL of its intention to block all of NARAL’s 
communications to its wireless Internet subscribers, NARAL would have little recourse to communicate via text or the 
Internet with these subscribers. Just as the would-be sender of unpopular snail mail would have little recourse if the U.S. 
Postal Service enjoyed the discretion to refuse to transmit its communications,51 so too does the would-be sender lack 
meaningful options to communicate if its wireless provider refuses to transmit its communications. 
  
In short, even assuming counterfactually that the market conditions exist for subscribers to express meaningfully their 
preferences and to discipline effectively wireless providers, a transparency-in-discrimination requirement insufficiently 
protects the full panoply of First Amendment free speech interests. 
  
IV. SPECIALIZED SERVICES AND A SPECIALIZED NONDISCRIMINATION MANDATE 
   
 
 
 
Both the FCC and the Verizon-Google proposed framework suggest a different regulatory approach for the provision of 
general broadband Internet access services, on the one hand, and the provision of “specialized” or “additional online 
services,” on the other, in which the latter would not be subject to a nondiscrimination (or even a transparency-in-
discrimination) requirement. “Specialized Services” are defined to include “additional or differentiated services [that] would 
have to be distinguishable in scope and purpose from broadband Internet access service” and might include a service offered 
by a broadband provider that was devoted to telemedicine or to online gaming that require enhanced quality of service.52 
Several commentators have expressed concern that carving out specialized services and exempting them from the 
nondiscrimination and transparency mandates might provide an incentive for providers to migrate more of their offerings 
toward this unregulated category with the result that this exception would swallow the rule and there would be little left of 
the “neutral” part of the Internet. I share these concerns and suggest that the First Amendment public forum doctrine provides 
a useful framework for evaluating the free speech implications of according differential regulation to such services. 
Essentially, I argue that broadband providers providing general broadband Internet access services perform a role that is 
analogous to offering and facilitating a general public forum and should be subject to the same stringent nondiscrimination 
mandate as are providers of general public forums. In contrast, broadband providers providing specialized services perform a 
role that is analogous to offering a limited public forum and accordingly should be subject to a more limited--but still 
meaningful--nondiscrimination mandate, such as that imposed on providers of limited-purpose public forums under First 
Amendment law. 
  
Public forums--spaces that are open to the public for purposes of communication and expression--whether in real space or 
cyberspace--are essential to our form of democratic self-government. Within places that have traditionally been available for 
expressive purposes--like public parks, streets, sidewalks, or property that has been designated for expressive purposes-- like 
auditoriums and concert halls--speakers are permitted to express themselves from whatever viewpoints and on whatever 
subjects they choose. Within these traditional, designated public forums, citizens enjoy the fullest and most meaningful 
protection of their right to free expression. The provider of such a public forum is required under the public forum doctrine to 
permit all manner of expression--regardless of the content of such speech or the viewpoint expressed within the forum53--and 
any restrictions on speech in these forums are subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.54 On public streets and sidewalks and 
other “natural and proper places for the dissemination of information,”55 the government has no power to censor speech on 
disfavored topics or from unpopular viewpoints. When Jersey City sought to ban the Committee for Industrial Organization 
from communicating with city residents about employment-related matters on its streets and sidewalks, the Court explained 
that the government does not enjoy the same rights as private property owners to exclude individuals from its property; 
rather, our form of democratic self-government requires that the government accord citizens meaningful opportunities to 
express themselves, as well as meaningful venues in which to do so.56 When the state sought to prohibit individuals from 
leafleting in airport terminals, Justice Kennedy, undertaking a functional interpretation of the public forum doctrine, 
explained that open public spaces that are suitable for discourse must be conceptualized as public forums if the doctrine is to 
retain relevance “in times of fast-changing technology.”57 The role of providers of general public forums--like streets, 
sidewalks, airport terminals, and other open public spaces suitable for discourse--is to facilitate communications without 
discrimination on the basis of content or viewpoint. Just as it is impermissible for the provider of a public forum--whether the 
government or a “private” entity58--to discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint (i.e., “no political speech here” or “no 
Tea Party speech here”), so too it should be impermissible for providers of general broadband Internet access services to 
discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint. 
  
In contrast, the government--or a private entity like a broadband provider--may establish a public forum that is devoted to 
particular purposes or subjects. First Amendment doctrine provides that, within a public forum devoted to particular subjects 
or purposes, the provider may impose restrictions limiting expression to the particular subjects or purposes for which the 
forum is designated. While discrimination on the basis of viewpoint is not permitted within such limited public forums, 
discrimination on the basis of subject is permissible to ensure that the subject-matter confines of the forum are maintained. 
As the Supreme Court explained regarding the permissible types of restrictions in limited public forums: 
 
The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify 
the [owner, here the State] in reserving it ... for the discussion of certain topics. Once it has opened a limited 
public forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude 
speech where its distinction is not “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,” nor may it 
discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint ....59 
   
 
 
 
 
For example, in a case where a public school district had expressly opened up its school facilities to after-hours use by 
members of the public for “social, civic, and recreational purposes”--including the discussion of family issues and child 
rearing--the district was required to facilitate expression on these topics from all viewpoints, including religious viewpoints. 
As the Court explained, “‘although a speaker may be excluded ... if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the 
[limited] purposes of the forum ..., the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to 
suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”’60 
  
By analogy to the public forum doctrine, broadband providers’ provision of specialized services should be subject to a rule 
prohibiting viewpoint discrimination and prohibiting unreasonable discrimination but allowing subject-matter distinctions 
where necessary and consistent with preserving “the purposes of that limited forum.”61 For example, under the framework I 
suggest, if a broadband provider offered a specialized service devoted to medical services, it would be permissible for it to 
prohibit non-medical related content, but not to prohibit pro-choice or pro-birth control related medical content or 
applications. Knotty questions might arise, for example, if a provider sought to define the subject of a specialized service as a 
“Christian medical service” or a “family-friendly gaming service” and to limit content and applications to those categories. 
But First Amendment public forum doctrine is sufficiently well-developed to provide helpful tools for handling these 
complicated questions as well.62 
  
CONCLUSION 
The FCC is to be applauded for undertaking measures to impose a meaningful nondiscrimination mandate on wireline 
broadband Internet providers who serve as conduits for our communications in an increasingly important manner. However, 
the FCC should not exempt wireless providers from this mandate--even assuming that the wireless market is more 
competitive than the wireline market. Because free speech values are non-market values, they cannot be entrusted solely to 
the market--even if the market were characterized by robust competition and meaningful disclosure requirements (which it is 
not). To protect our free speech interests in the Internet realm, broadband providers-- both wireline and wireless--should be 
subject to a nondiscrimination mandate. And, while it may be permissible to carve out exceptions to the broad 
nondiscrimination mandate for “specialized” services, the regulation of these services should be informed by the public 
forum doctrine, which imposes meaningful and appropriate protections for First Amendment rights within both general and 
limited public forums. 
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